History of the FGDR

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Born out of the failure in 1999 of a locally systemic bank, Crédit Martiniquais, the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD at the time) was built with a sense of urgency. It had to invent and set up a structure, draft the texts needed for its governance and resolve this crisis in the best interests of the customers and local financial stability, all at the same time. 

Both young and mature, the FGDR, like the French financial sector, has undergone profound changes over the past 20 years. 

Sommaire

A history tied to the development of the banking system and regulatory requirements

HISTORY OF THE FGDR
KEY LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS   IMPORTANT STEPS 
Order No. 2020-1496 which establishes the list of public and private institutions covered by the law of the 17 of June 2020 subject to an obligation to transfer their availabilities to the Treasury. Measure of the Concil of state on the mission of the FGDR. These measures are implemented during the year 2021.  2021 The FGDR more than its general interest mission is in charge of a public service mission. The FGDR centralizes most of its financial ressources on the account of the Treasury, while keeping its accessibility. 
Decree of 25 March 2019 amending the Decree of 27 October 2015 on the FGDR's financial resources. 2019 New framework establishing the FGDR's ability to borrow over more than one year, as an exception to the rules applicable to public administrations.
Decrees of 18 February 2019 defining the rules for the application of the deposit guarantee scheme to factoring activities. 2019 Definition of the coverage of factoring transactions by the deposit guarantee scheme, based on the total net balance of factoring transactions.
Provision of Law no. 2018-700 of 3 August 2018 transposing the PSD2 Directive protecting up to €100,000 per PI/EMI customer with deposits in a ring-fenced account at a credit institution. 2018 Ring-fenced accounts of a PI/EMI (payment and electronic money institution) become eligible for the deposit guarantee scheme up to €100,000 per end customer.
Decree of 28 April 2017 on the approval of the FGDR’s Internal Regulations. 2017 Adoption of the existing internal regulations of the the FGDR’s Supervisory Board. 
European Cooperation Agreement for Cross-Border Compensation within the 31 countries of the European Economic Area dated 15 September 2016. 2016 Joint adoption within the European Forum of Deposit Insurers (EFDI) of a Home/Host Cooperation Agreement among the deposit guarantee schemes aimed at organising their cooperation in case of compensation of customers of branches located in another country of the European Union.
Decrees of 27 October 2015:
1/ decree relating to the implementation of the deposit guarantee scheme, the compensation ceiling and the rules for the application of Article L. 312-4-1 of the Monetary and Financial Code;
2/ decree on the notification of depositors regarding the deposit guarantee scheme;
3/ decree implementing para. 4 of Article L. 312-16 of the Monetary and Financial Code;
4/ decree relating to the financial resources of the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution;
5/ decree relating to savings accounts guaranteed by the French government.
2015 Regulatory transposition of the provisions of the DGSD Directive
1/ Measures relating to the scope of the guarantee, the ceiling and the compensation process;
2/ Measures for notifying depositors;
3/ ACPR opinion procedure on the Supervisory Board's decisions regarding contributions;
4/ Measures regarding call for contributions procedures at the FGDR;
5/ Measures establishing the FGDR as the French government's operator for the French government guarantee.
Order 2015-1024 of 20 August 2015 containing various provisions for adapting legislation to European Union financial law. 2015 Transposition into the Monetary and Financial Code of the provisions resulting from the DGSD2 directive (scope and limits of the guarantee, temporary high balances, the FGDR's governance) and the BRRD Directive.
Directive 2014/59/EU of 15 May 2014 establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms (BRRD). 2014  
Directive 2014/49/EU of 16 April 2014 on deposit guarantee schemes (DGSD). 2014  
Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) regulation adopted by the European Parliament on 15 April 2014 and the related intergovernmental treaty. 2014 Establishment of the Single Resolution Board (SRB) for the euro zone, responsible for resolution decisions, and creation of a Single Resolution Fund (SRF) i .
Decree of 13 March 2014 amending Regulation no. 99-05 of 9 July 1999 on the deposit guarantee scheme or other repayable funds. 2014 Implementation of the obligations related to “Single Customer View” files.
  2013 Preventative intervention in favour of the customers of DUBUS SA (investor compensation scheme).
Law no. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 on the separation and regulation of banking activities. 2013 The FGD becomes the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR).
Decree of 29 September 2010 transposing Directive no. 2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009 into French law regarding the FGD’s payment period and payment amount for customers of failed banks. 2010 Intervention in favour of the customers of EGP (investor compensation scheme).
European Directive no. 2009/14/EC of 11 March 2009 amending Directive no. 94/19/EC relating to the payment amount (€100,000) and payment period (20 working days) by deposit guarantee schemes. 2009  
  2000 Intervention in favour of the customers of Mutua-Equipement (performance bonds guarantee).
  1999 Preventative intervention in Crédit Martiniquais (deposit guarantee scheme).
French Law no. 99-532 of 25 June 1999 on savings and financial security creating the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD) and entrusting it with the management of the deposit guarantee, investor compensation and performance bonds guarantee schemes. 1999 Creation of the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD) by the Law of 25 June 1999.
European Directive no. 97/9/EC of 3 March 1997 establishing investor compensation systems (investor compensation scheme). 1997  
Directive 94/19/EC of 30 May 1994 establishing deposit guarantee schemes within the European Community. 1994  
Prior to the creation of the FGDR, a compensation fund existed within the Association Française des Banques (AFB), the French banking association. This fund covered only AFB member banks, did not have the status of a legal entity and was not operationally autonomous.    

 

Stage 1: creation of the FGDR

How was the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts created?

  • Prior to the creation of the FGDR, a compensation fund existed within the Association Française des Banques (AFB), the French banking association. This fund covered only AFB member banks, did not have the status of a legal entity and was not operationally autonomous. Mutual and cooperative networks were covered by their internal mutual support mechanism.

  • On this basis, the decision was made at the time to create a universal fund which all mutual and cooperative banks would be required to join, to give it the status of legal entity with its own governance and to increase its resources.

  • At the same time, all licensed banks in France, including those with a capital structure as well as mutual and cooperative banks, agreed to join the professional association which in 2001 would become the Fédération Bancaire Française (FBF), the French banking federation.

Founding legislative text

The Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD) was created by Article 65 of Law no. 99-532 of 25 June 1999 relating to savings and financial security. Through the new Articles 52-1 to 52-14 of the Banking Act of 24 January 1984 (which later became Articles L. 312-4 et seq. of the French Monetary and Financial Code), this law entrusted the management of the deposit guarantee scheme to the FGD, required all authorised banks to be members of the FGD, defined its resources and established the key statutory provisions governing the Fund.
 

From the outset: two intervention methods and three guarantees 

The creation of the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts (FGD) made it possible to respond to the two crises that arose at the time, at Crédit Martiniquais and Mutua-Equipement. 

  • The FGDR’s scope, which goes well beyond compensation alone, includes the ability to intervene in a troubled institution on a preventative basis: by providing capital or guarantees, before an actual failure, so as to protect the activities that could fail, including customers’ deposits. Like compensation, preventative action, similar to what we now call “resolution”, was designed as a means of achieving the single objective of securing the depositor and improving the stability of the banking sector.
  • Furthermore, since its creation the FGD alone has been entrusted with managing the various guarantees for customers of banks and financial institutions to ensure the coherence of these mechanisms and interventions and to optimise the resources allocated to them. The securities guarantee (also called “investor compensation”) and the performance bonds guarantee schemes were therefore added to the deposit guarantee scheme.

     

How was the investor compensation scheme created?

The principles of the investor compensation scheme were established by Law no. 96-597 of 2 July 1996, known as the Financial Activity Modernisation Act (Article 62). Responsibility for this scheme was assigned to the FGD pursuant to Article 70 of the 1999 law on savings and financial stability.
 

How was the performance bonds guarantee scheme created? 

  • The performance bonds guarantee scheme is of national origin only. It results from Article 72 of the same law of 25 June 1999. 

  • This article stipulates that the mechanism retroactively covers performance bonds granted by any credit institution for which judicial receivership proceedings were initiated after 1 January 1996.

Stage 2: impact of the financial crisis

With the 2007-2009 financial crisis, the three-month compensation period for the European guarantee schemes seemed to offer far too little security for depositors, while the coverage level seemed too limited and insufficiently harmonised to properly protect customers and avoid bank runs.

The decision was made in 2009 at European level, and transposed into French law in 2010, to reduce the compensation period for customers of a failed bank to 20 working days (then to seven working days from 2014/2015). At the same time, the coverage level was increased and harmonised at €100,000 per customer, per institution.

For the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts, this was a major turning point which led to its deliberate and in-depth transformation. Without giving up its ability to intervene on a preventive basis, the FGDR worked hard to address the consequences of this new paradigm imposed by a requirement to pay compensation within seven working days. 
 

The work of the banking industry 

  • The FGDR has built data standards (the “SCV files") together with banks, worked on regulations with the public authorities, developed its own processes and IT resources, established a regular process to monitor credit institutions' ability to operate, expanded its teams and signed contracts with a growing number of external partners. 
  • It has also focused on customers of institutions by implementing an active communication policy. The FGDR has also made a commitment to conduct stress tests to ensure its operational capability. 
     

Sharing of experience with other guarantee schemes

Lastly, the FGDR seeks out best practices worldwide and shares its own experience with its counterparts. Two professional associations, the EFDI for Europe and the IADI for the entire world, make these stimulating and informative exchanges possible. 

Stage 3: the transformation

Post-2007-2009 crisis: from the FGD to the FGDR

  • In 2013, the creation of a national "resolution" scheme: Law no. 2013-672 of 26 July 2013 provides for the establishment of the banking resolution scheme in which the FGDR is heavily involved. The aim of this scheme is to resolve systemic crises that could affect very large institutions. 

  • This law changed the name of the FGD by adding the word “resolution”, making it the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR), just as the ACP became the Prudential Supervision and Resolution Authority (ACPR). 

  • In addition, the new law contains several clarifications regarding the operation of the deposit guarantee scheme and the FGDR, which concern access to the information it needs to prepare and carry out its mission, including information covered by bank secrecy.

Founding texts of the Banking Union within the euro zone

In 2014, the European framework for handling banking crises was strengthened with: 

  • a new Directive on deposit guarantee schemes (“DGSD 2”);
  • a new Directive on the recovery and resolution of banks (“BRRD”);
  • a new regulation on the Single Resolution Mechanism (“SRM”) and the related intergovernmental treaty.

These regulations made the Banking Union project a reality for the entire euro zone and were very quickly applied. Many of the topics covered directly concern the FGDR, which was involved in the transposition and implementation negotiations in 2015 and 2016. 

 

Title

Past interventions by the FGDR

Lead

The FGDR has intervened four times since it was created to guarantee securities, performance bonds and deposits. Discover the history of these four interventions.

Section

How did the FGDR intervene in favor of Crédit Martiniquais?

The operations of Crédit Martiniquais, a network bank based in the French Caribbean departments and closely linked to the local economic fabric, seriously deteriorated during the 1990s. A provisional administrator was appointed in May 1997. In September 1999, the Banking Commission (now the Autorité de Controle Prudentiel et de Résolution - ACPR) requested the Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution (FGDR) to carry out a preventive intervention. The aim was to avoid the bank entering into insolvency, which would have resulted in the unavailability of customer deposits and disrupted the local economy. The intervention primarily involved bridging the capital shortfall and providing Crédit Martiniquais with the resources to meet its immediate obligations, in order to enable the purchase of the network, along with its deposits, by a third-party operator.
The FGDR agreed to the intervention request and, in early 2000, disbursed nearly 1.7 billion francs (approximately €260 million) in the form of repayable advances. After recovering part of this amount through the sale of the network to BRED and the sale of liquidable assets during the liquidation of Crédit Martiniquais, the FGDR still holds a receivable of €178 million. It is working to recover this amount from the former executives.
The legal recovery process has seen several twists and turns, with actions taken in appeal and subsequently in cassation. The litigation is still ongoing.
In 2018, the judicial liquidator i of Financière du Forum, the company that succeeded Crédit Martiniquais, sued certain legal and de facto directors in a lawsuit for liability coverage. This case is still ongoing before the Paris Commercial Court. The details of these proceedings are presented in each of the FGDR’s annual reports since 2013.

Why did the FGDR intervene on behalf of the clients of Mutua-Équipement?

Mutua-Équipement had provided end-of-construction guarantees on behalf of homebuilders, benefiting their clients, the future owners of these homes. In 1997, Mutua-Équipement was placed into judicial liquidation. By decision of September 28, 1999, the Banking Commission requested the FGDR to intervene to compensate the client-owners in the event of a default by their builder.

The FGDR thus assumed the guarantee commitments issued by Mutua-Équipement. It managed 350 construction completion files and paid out over €6 million in compensation.

The FGDR’s intervention with Mutua-Équipement was completed with the closure of all client files and the resolution of any legal disputes. The company’s liquidator i sent the FGDR a final liquidation dividend. As a result, the intervention is considered definitively closed.

How did the FGDR intervene on behalf of the clients of EGP?

Européenne de Gestion Privée (EGP) was an investment firm licensed in 2006 for portfolio management on behalf of third parties and for the receipt and transmission of orders. Although the company was based in Bordeaux, nine-tenths of its operations were conducted through its Italian branch in Rome.
The intervention of the Deposit i Guarantee i Fund (FGDR) for the guarantee of securities was triggered on December 15, 2010, due to the company’s insolvency and its inability to return all or part of its clients’ assets. The ACPR appointed a banking liquidator i .
On January 10, 2011, the Bank i of Italy placed EGP’s Roman branch into forced administrative liquidation and appointed an administrative liquidator i . Insolvency was declared by the Bordeaux Commercial Court on January 12, 2011, and a judicial liquidator i was appointed.
On March 16, 2011, the FGDR notified the clients of the Bordeaux office (80 active clients holding €7 million in assets) that their entire holdings were available. They were able to freely dispose of them without the FGDR having to compensate them.
For the 800 clients of the Roman branch (approximately €250 million in assets), the FGDR conducted thorough investigations with the Italian liquidator i to determine the reality of the assets entrusted to the branch and what had happened to them. The majority of clients could not prove their contributions to EGP. A significant portion of the clients’ assets were likely held in tax havens. The final positions of the clients were determined in April 2012, and compensation payments amounted to just over €8 million.
Former EGP executives are being prosecuted in Italy for various charges, including fraudulent bankruptcy. The FGDR has joined as a civil party. Other lawsuits have been filed in France by former EGP clients. A total of 84 lawsuits were filed before the Paris Administrative Court. However, this figure represents less than 10% of the compensation or rejection decisions made by the FGDR.
Once the investigation was concluded, all cases were called to a single hearing on February 18, 2014. Through a series of decisions made in March and July 2014, the Paris Administrative Court dismissed all 84 lawsuits, thus validating the FGDR’s approach in terms of client eligibility for compensation and the amounts awarded to the applicants.
None of the dismissed applicants appealed these judgments, which became final.
Additionally, the criminal lawsuits in Italy against former executives, in which the FGDR joined as a civil party, continued. In a landmark ruling on December 2, 2016, the Rome District Court sentenced the main executive at the time and eight others to various prison terms of up to 4 years for fraud against clients and for the illegal exercise of activities. The court also ordered the parties to compensate the FGDR.
The criminal proceedings continued in 2018, with the FGDR being represented in hopes of recovering some of the funds spent on compensating clients.

How did the FGDR’s preventive intervention take place for the clients of Dubus SA?

Dubus SA was a brokerage firm based in Lille, authorized as an investment firm with the ancillary activity of account keeping and custody. Its main business was as an online broker specializing in stock and derivative markets. It remained independent and had over 2,000 clients, primarily individuals.
At the end of 2012, an insufficiency in the segregation of client funds became apparent, alongside an ongoing operating deficit that had been draining the company’s cash flow for several years. This insufficiency grew large enough that, starting in July, the ACPR decided to take coercive measures. On July 12, 2013, the ACPR appointed a provisional administrator to determine the origin of the segregation insufficiency and verify its amount.
The Supervisory Board approved the FGDR’s preventive intervention in favor of Dubus SA during its meeting on October 11, 2013. On October 18, the ACPR adopted the required precautionary measures and set November 30 as the date for the cessation of activities.
The segregation account was opened at the Banque de France i on October 23, and client funds began to be transferred there from October 25.
In total, the FGDR’s effort to cover the segregation insufficiency amounted to €3,806,722.75.
The business and most of its clientele were successfully sold to Bourse-Direct. The provisional administrator appointed by the ACPR subsequently declared the company’s insolvency before the Lille Commercial Court on February 4, 2014. The court placed the company into judicial liquidation on February 17, 2014, and appointed a judicial liquidator i , while the provisional administrator was appointed as the banking liquidator i by the ACPR. On March 27, the FGDR declared its claim for the amount of the segregation insufficiency it had paid.
No legal proceedings related to the FGDR’s intervention or the segregation mechanism put in place to isolate client funds were initiated, so this case can be considered closed.